This seminar focuses on Iran and Egypt as two of the most populous countries of the Middle East, albeit with different routes to modernization. First, it examines the literature on the political and social conditions in Iran since the early twentieth century, and, at the same time, it compares Iran to Egypt (and Turkey) in their political, economic, social and legal underpinnings.

Iran is known to be the motherland of contemporary Shi‘ism, but it should be noted that such a view of Islam, which has rivaled the orthodox Sunnis since early Islam (even though it was not labeled as such in its formative period), was only introduced in Iran by the Safavid dynasty in the early sixteenth century through mystical sufism. The blend of Shi‘i literature, traditions, and corps of ulama (the scholars in religion and jurisprudence), which Shi‘ism is known for today, only materialized as such in the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries with the early Safavids, and developed further under the Qajars and later with the Pahlavis, the last dynasty to rule Iran up to the 1978–79 revolution.

The combination of Shi‘ism together with a dynastic monarchy has proved to be one of the key ingredients for understanding Iran’s modern history, in particular when it comes to the legitimacy of dynastic monarchical rule. In effect, Shi‘ism draws its legitimacy from the persona and practices of Islam’s fourth caliph, imam ‘Ali, who was at the same time the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad, having married his daughter Fatima (originally the Shi‘is were referred to as the Alids). In the Shi‘i tradition, therefore, Ali and his two sons from Fatima, Hasan and Husayn, are considered as the first three imams of the Shi‘i traditions (I use tradition in plural, as there are more than one in Shi‘ism). The majority of Shi‘is today, known as the Twelver Shi‘is, would acknowledge their allegiance to the twelve imams, from Ali up to the ninth-century vanished imam (or the awaited imam).

With the bulk of the Shi‘is devoted to their imams, considered as the carriers of the tradition and the genuine interpreters of God’s word in His holy texts, an undeniable historical tension arose
between the imamate and dynastic rule as witnessed in the time of the Safavids (1501–1779), Qajars (1779–1925), and Pahlavis (1925–1979). If one subscribes to the view that the imams are the ones to hold the truth (textual, moral, and jurisprudential), then what is the role of a dynastic monarch in this regard? The real historical tension, however, was not simply about the imamate truth, whatever that may be, but mainly on the status and function of the ulama corps in Shi‘i Islam, and Iranian society in particular. It is known that the Ottomans (a Sunni Turkic dynasty that adopted Hanafism as its main law school), the main Islamic rivals to the Iranian empires, had bureaucratized their ulama corps, while tightening on their economic resources, which were for the most part known as waqf mortmain properties. The Shi‘i ulama, by contrast, did not mainly survive from their waqf properties, but mostly from the Islamic taxes that the mass of believers were subjected to, which gave the ulama an unprecedented autonomous base and made them uncontrollable by the state.

Another source of tension for the three successive dynasties that ruled Iran since the early sixteenth century is undeniably the multi-ethnic nature of the populations and their various tribal affiliations, which reduces the dominance of the Persian Farsi element to no more than 50 percent. As can be detected from this 2004 map, the situation is no different today.
The Persian element (in light green) is mostly present in the center, south, and east of Iran. Besides the capital Tehran (which became capital in 1786 under the Qajars), the other main centers of Shi’ism are the city of Qom in the north (a main hub of learning for Shi’ism, together with Najaf and Karbala in the south of neighboring Iraq), Esfahan, Shiraz and Mashhad. For its part, the north-east, alongside the border with Armenia and Azerbaijan, is dominated by the Azeri ethnicity, while the Kurds are for the most part located in the north-west, along the Iraqi and Turkish borders. There are two locations for the Arab minority: along the south-west border with Iraq, on the Khorramshahr–Abadan axis, and further south on the Persian Gulf, to which Bandar ‘Abbas serves as epicenter. Finally, last but not least, the Baloch are located in the south-east along the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, both of which host important Baloch minorities.

For the periods we are concerned with, it is important to note that the combination of ethnicity (considered as religion, Muslim or non-Muslim minority, language, culture, and “imagined community,” which keeps working on the conditions of its imagined togetherness under the most salient conditions) with tribalism has invariably represented an obstacle to the emerging nascent nation-state, an issue that has become ever more troublesome under the present Islamic Republic.
Consider, for instance, all the problems that have emerged as an outcome of Kurdish nationalism, not only in Iran itself, but also in neighboring Turkey, Iraq, and Syria; or the claims for an autonomous Baluchistan territory, which would be jointly shared with similar Baloch dominated areas in neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan. In each instance the nation-state is struggling with quasi-separatist movements, in addition to secularist calls of all kinds that have serious grievances with the Islamic character of the Republic.

However, even though the ethnic grievances exacerbate even further the nascent nation-state, the weaknesses of the state should not be solely attributed to the multi-ethnic nature of Iranian society. One should rather look for the historical weaknesses of the nation-state in the region as a whole in respect to the fragmentation of the traditional élite groups within the now defunct empire formations (Ottoman, Safavid and Qajar). In effect, picking up on Barrington Moore’s thesis of “no bourgeoisie, no democracy,” it is possible to analyze the historical weaknesses of the Iranian state in conjunction with the weaknesses and fragmentation of its élite groups, understood as the agglomeration of landowners, rentiers, merchants (bazaaris), moneylenders, manufacturers, military personnel, bureaucrats, ulama, intellectuals and artists. When, for instance, landowners, with or without state protection, live mostly from rents extracted from their peasants surpluses, without much investment in other domains such as trade, manufacturing and industry, a class of reactionary rentiers would de facto become a burden to a dynastic monarchy or republic alike. Moreover, when landowners, merchants, moneylenders and manufacturers live as segregated groups with only occasional work in common, they would tend to clamp down all too easily on any representative public sphere. Overall, Iran lacked a centralized, articulate, ambitious, and productive élite groups that would have contributed towards the formation of a stable and prosperous nation-state. Besides an often bankrupt monarchy that intermittently lived under Russian and/or British protection, and intellectuals equally divided towards foreign loyalties, the weight of the traditional ulama should not be underestimated, considering that unlike their Ottoman Sunni counterparts, Shi‘i ulama always posed a threat to a dynastic power (whose legitimation was not constructed on ancestral links either to the prophet’s lineage or to that of the Twelver imami tradition), through their allegiance to an imamate tradition that looked suspiciously towards a secular political dynastic ideology.

More to the point, and unlike their Sunni counterparts of the Ottoman Empire, the Shi‘i ulama were not limited to their awqāf mortmain endowments (which were subject to confiscation by the ruling dynasty), surviving mostly from personal Islamic taxes like the khums, or the one-fifth income tax that would be handled directly to the imam, or the charitable zakāt tax.

When it came to political legitimation, and while the Qajars have attempted to uphold the view that the sovereign has the right and power to interpret the law, the bulk of the ulama did not budge to share such views. Moreover, by the early nineteenth century, when the Qajar view of government implied that the mujtahid ulama do not have the right to govern (hence at best be limited to the interpretation of the law), the notion of wilāyat al-faqīh, the governorship of the jurist (which was later to become Khomeini’s famous dictum), began to circulate among some ulama. In short, even on basic issues of the legitimacy of dynastic rule, the sovereign as lawgiver, the right of the state to enact religious and secular laws, the consensus was not there between rulers, ulama, secular intellectuals and minorities, and other élite groups.

Nowhere were such divisions more visible than in the most memorable event that would mark Iranian politics at the dawn of the twentieth century: the constitutional revolution in 1906. In Many ways, as Abrahamian’s major study sums it up, Iran’s twentieth century is marked by “two revolutions”: 1906 and 1978; the two mirroring one another in that they share some disturbing infrastructural similarities. Chief among them is the permanent uneasy tension between dynastic
rule and the ulama, the bankruptcy of the state and the delegitimizing of the monarchy in the eyes of the general public, the investment of bazaaris in land ownership (due partly to the monarchy’s selloff of its own properties), all such heterogeneous elements within different social categories contributing towards “populist” attitudes in politics.

At a time when Russians and British were attempting to deepen their tutelage over the Qajars, the 1906 events, known as the “constitutional (or constitutionalist) revolution,” broke out when Iranian political life began to be dominated by landowners. In the 1860s, with the monarchy’s bankruptcy, the state began selling some of its holdings to private individuals, and even though many of the traditional landowners benefited from such large selloffs, adding to their already considerable estates, the bazaaris were probably the ones who benefited the most, entering the landowning scene with vengeance. Even though it remains unclear how much the ulama factions benefited from such selloffs, they should not be underestimated among landowners, ranking probably third after the traditional landowners and the bazaaris. This consortium of landowners, in the absence of a strong manufacturing and financial class, and in the new overlap of bazaaris with landownership, was to dominate Iran throughout the twentieth century, orienting agriculture towards the export of commodities with regional and international appeal, such as opium, cotton, tobacco, or mulberry plantations for silk production. Thus, besides locking agriculture into exports, there were only limited investments in manufacturing and industry, transforming the most thriving élite groups into self-satisfied rentiers. Always a majority in post-parliamentary Iran, this consortium of landowners would block all attempts for agrarian reforms until the “white revolution” in the early 1960s. More importantly, such a consortium, combining economic and ideological power in the form of landowners, bazaaris, and ulama, would challenge dynastic rule (first the Qajars and later the Pahlavis) through broad populist movements that in all their confusing heterogeneity would consolidate reactionary politics rather than clear sightedness.

Such a conglomeration of heterogeneous groups was already visible in the constitutional revolution in 1906. On the positive side, the events led to Iran’s first constitution, modeled after the Belgian, and parliament, forcing a corrupt Qajar monarchy to have its power checked through parliamentary and legislative action. But, on the other hand, even though some of the ulama strongly participated and became the star figures of the movement, their participation, and later hesitations towards the legitimacy of the monarchy, would later signal deep drifts in Iranian society regarding the status of the monarchy and the possibility of republicanism, the issues of secularism, laicism, the status of the ulama and the doctrines of the Twelver imamis, all of which would remain unsettled throughout the twentieth century until this day.

Unlike Iran, Egypt was a product of the Ottoman Empire, but whose fate, thanks to the Napoleonic expedition in 1798–1802, made it the first quasi-independent Arab province. When the Ottoman sultan Selim III dispatched the Albanian Mehmed Ali Pasha at the head of an
impressive military force to recapture Egypt from the French, he had no idea what his viceroy would be capable of.

Like the other Arab provinces, Ottoman Egypt was formally controlled on the top by its élite groups: the a’yan (urban notables), the ulama, the Janissaries, and landowners and moneylenders. Egypt, however, had a special status group known as the Mamluk Pashas, which were remnants of the old order, and which thanks to their military might, kept an upper hand on politics and the economy, controlling the land tenure system. Already weakened by the French expedition, it was their final defeat at the hands of Mehmed Ali’s army in 1805 that established the sultan’s viceroy as Egypt’s new ruler and modernizer.

Egypt unexpected route to modernization, which would precede the Ottoman Tanzimat, would begin with the abolition of the tax-farming system known as the iltizam in 1814, and its centralization at the hands of the state. Egypt’s army not only grew at a fast pace, participating in successful expeditions in neighboring Sudan, Yemen, Greece and Syria, but more importantly, it incorporated modern medical and juridical techniques for the recruitment of soldiers, transforming it into a mighty rival to the sultan’s “new” army. Modernization would pursue its due course whilst the adoption of new techniques in the cultivation of cotton, Egypt’s prime export commodity; in industries which served the expanding army; in the planning of cities (Cairo and Alexandria); and in a total revamp of the judicial system.

Even though expanding the army, agriculture, and industry would prove beneficial to Egypt, the method of modernization, namely, the abusive centralization of major assets within the apparatuses of the state, would soon prove detrimental to a healthy expansion of the economy. In effect, once the rule of Mehmed Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha was over by the 1850s, and passed to much weaker heirs, many of the state’s agricultural and industrial assets would soon go to private families, transforming the latter into a de facto monopoly and a reactionary political force. As the state was unable to keep up with a sound fiscal strategy, accumulating large debts to foreign investors, the country was occupied in 1882 by the British, who looked at Egypt as a further expansion to their colonial Indian enterprise.

The British would willy-nilly remain active in Egypt until the free officers revolution in 1952. With Gamal Abdul Nasser coming to power in 1952, Egypt would opt for a series of statist measures that would ultimately establish themselves as a blueprint for the Arab world at large: the undermining of the power of the colonial bourgeoisie through methods of confiscation or nationalization of rural, urban, manufacturing, financial and educational assets. Which led to a state-controlled economy, where the state’s security is monopolized by an ever growing army, paramilitary groups, and intelligence services.

The dismantlement of the colonial liberal order was therefore quick to happen, and in Egypt that order was already fully reversed by the mid-1950s: by then Egypt, the most populous Arab country, was running under a massive civil and military bureaucracy where the role of the military (as epitomized by Nasser himself) and intelligence services had become paramount; where education and the economy were fully dominated by the statist bureaucracy; and where the peasantry, looked upon as suspicious for its conservatism and subjection to old landlord families, was subject to constant political mobilization. Such drastic processes, irreversibly anti-liberal, would serve as blueprint for the rest of the Arab world, and by the late 1950s other Arab countries would follow suit. In 1958 the coup of Abdul-Karim Qasim, another disgruntled officer, has put a sudden and bloody end to the rule of the Hashimite monarchy which had been ruling Iraq since the 1920s. In 1963 the Baath Party came to power in both Iraq and Syria, whose rule has been further brutally consolidated in the 1970s with Hafiz al-Asad in Syria and Saddam Hussein in
Iraq. In 1969, a coup led by an unknown and young officer under the name of Mu‘ammar al-Gadhafi, damaged the long and stable rule of the Idrissi monarchy in Libya. By 1978–79 this “second political and economic order” was locked and further consolidated thanks to the Iranian revolution, which undermined the Pahlavi dynasty, and a tradition of Shi‘i monarchism since the early sixteenth century, instituting an Islamic Republic for the first time in the Middle East and West Asia.
GENERAL

Below is a schedule of the weekly readings that we’ll discuss in class. You will be periodically asked to present individual chapters and topics. Assignments for presentations will be posted weekly on Blackboard.

In addition to the two-draft free-topic paper (see below the section on papers), you’ll have to submit two interpretive essays based on our films and weekly readings: you’ll receive sets of questions for each. Each paper counts as 25 percent of the total. All interpretive essays are take-home and you’ll be given a week to submit them. The purpose of the interpretive essays is to give you the opportunity to go “beyond” the literal meaning of a text and adopt interpretive and “textual” techniques. All essays and papers must be submitted on time according to the set deadlines.

| First Interpretive Essay, due March 12 | 25% |
| Final Interpretive Essay, due May 2 | 25% |
| Term-paper: 2 drafts 10–15% each | 25% |
| - First draft due on April 4 | |
| - Second draft on May 2 | |
| Presentations, Blackboard postings, and class attendance and participation | 25% |

- It is essential that you complete all readings on time, and that you come to class well prepared. Always come to class with the required book: we’ll discuss all readings extensively.
- The first and final interpretive essays are based on our weekly readings. They all consist of a single essay for which you’ll receive the appropriate questions at the dates above, and you’ll submit them in class a week or two later.
- All papers follow the procedures outlined below in the section on papers.
- Essays are to be submitted only in class. Do not email or fax any material. Do not submit your papers outside the classroom.
- It’s your responsibility to submit all essays in class on time at the deadlines below. Late papers will be graded accordingly, and papers submitted a week after the deadline will be graded F.
- You must also submit, in addition to the printed hard copies, an equivalent electronic file of each paper in the dropbox on Blackboard.
- Each non-submitted paper will receive the grade of F, and your final grade will be averaged accordingly.
- The mid-term paper is a free-topic exercise based on a topic of your own choice.
- If you do not show up for an assigned presentation, you’ll be graded F.
TENTATIVE SCHEDULE
All dates, readings and films are tentatively scheduled and could be subject to change pending on our progress throughout the semester. Any change will be posted beforehand on Blackboard. Additional readings might be posted on Blackboard.

- Week 1: January 15/17
  Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton University Press 1982, 9780691101347).
- Week 2: January 22/24
  Abrahamian, continued
- Week 3: January 29/31
  Abrahamian, continued
- Week 4: February 5/7
  Abrahamian, continued
- Week 5: February 12/14
  First essay: to be submitted March 12

- Week 6: February 19/21
  Kurzman, continued
- Week 7: February 26/28
- Week 8: March 12/14
  Mitchell, continued
- Week 9: March 19/21
  First term-paper draft: April 4

- Week 10: March 26/28
  Beinin & Lockman, continued
- Week 11: April 2/4
- Week 12: April 9/11
- Week 13: April 16/18
- Week 14: April 23/25
  Yavuz, continued

  Final essay: to be submitted May 2
  May 2: Submission of final drafts
PAPERS

You are requested to write one major research paper to be submitted on May 2. You will have to submit, however, a first draft of this paper on April 4. The first draft should be as complete as possible and follow the same presentation and writing guidelines as your final draft, and it will count as 10% of your total grade unless the final draft is of superior quality. The purpose of the first draft is to let you assess your research and writing skills and improve the final version of your paper. It is advisable that you choose a research topic and start preparing a bibliography as soon as possible. I would strongly recommend that you consult with me before making any final commitment. It would be preferable to keep the same topic for both drafts. You will be allowed, however, after prior consultation, to change your topic if you wish to do so.

Papers must be related to Iran, Egypt, Turkey and the middle east, and/or film and film theory. Papers with broader topoi must first receive instructor’s approval. Papers should be analytical and conceptual. Avoid pure narratives and chronologies and construct your paper around a main thesis.


May 2: final draft deadline

Keep in mind the following when preparing your preliminary and final drafts:

• once you’ve decided on a paper-topic and prepared a preliminary bibliography, post an abstract and bibliography of your topic on blackboard <blackboard.luc.edu> (see below). Your 1,000-word abstract should include: (i) title; (ii) description; (iii) sources; (iv) methodology (e.g. suggestions on how to read sources). Your preliminary draft will not be accepted unless you’ve submitted an on-line abstract before March 30.
• preliminary drafts should be submitted on time, April 4.
• preliminary drafts should be complete and include footnotes and an annotated bibliography. (The Turabian reference above is annotated: it briefly spells what the book is about and to whom it might be useful.)
• do not submit an outline as a first draft.
• incomplete and poorly written first drafts will not be accepted, and you’ll be advised to revise your first draft completely.
• if you submit a single draft, you’ll receive F for 10% of the total and your final grade will be averaged accordingly.
• your final draft should take into consideration all the relevant comments provided on your earlier draft:
  • all factual and grammatical mistakes should be corrected, in addition to other stylistic revisions.
- passages indicated as “revise” or “unclear” or “awkward” should be totally revised.
- when specific additional references have been suggested, you should do your best to incorporate them into your material.
- there might be several additional suggestions in particular on your overall assumptions and methodology. It will be up to you to decide what to take into consideration.
- if you’re interested in comments on your final paper and interpretive essay, request an appointment by e-mail.

Please use the following guidelines regarding the format of your papers:

- use 8x10 white paper (the size and color of this paper). Do not use legal size or colored paper.
- only type on one side of the paper.
- should be double spaced, with single spaced footnotes at the end of each page and an annotated bibliography at the end (see bibliography below).
- keep ample left and right margins for comments and corrections of at least 1.25 inches each.
- all pages should be numbered and stapled.
- a cover page should include the following: paper’s title, course number and section, your name, address, e-mail, and telephone.

**Electronic Forum**

This course is listed on the Loyola Blackboard webpage to freely post messages and conduct discussions: login at <blackboard.luc.edu> and follow the instructions.

Besides a synopsis of all your presentations and term-paper, you must post each week a news item on the Middle Eastern or world art scenes. An Op-Ed or a reply to a posting are considered valid entries.

**References**


Iran & Egypt


Pearson, Lyle. "Four Years of African Film." Film Quarterly 26, no. 3 (1973): 42.


Iranian cinema

Hamid Dabashi, Close Up, Verso 1859843328.
Jonathan Rosenbaum, Abbas Kiarostami, Illinois 0252071115.
Geoff Andrew, 10, BFI Publishing 1-84457-069-X.

1. Islam & The Early Empires—General

The Qur’ân is the holy book of the Muslims (in all their different factions and sects) delivered by God in Arabic to the community of believers (umma) through the “medium” of the Prophet Muhammad in sessions of “revelation” (waḥī). Thus Arabic is not only the language of the Qur’ân (and the Sunna), but also a divine language, the language of God. All translations of the Qur’ân are thus considered as illegitimate and inaccurate. There are several such “translations”/“interpretations” available. A classical one would be that

R. Stephen Humphreys, *Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry* (Princeton University Press, 1991), is a long annotated and commented bibliography thematically organized. Recommended for all those looking at the best in the field for sources available in English, French and German. Some references to primary sources, mainly Arabic medieval sources, are also included. The problem with this “inquiry” is that it excludes from its field of investigation all publications in modern Arabic, as well as Turkish and Persian. In short, this book is an excellent tool for a primary survey on the status of the Middle Eastern Studies field in Europe and North America.


Ira Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge University Press, 1988), is a complete fourteen-century history of Islamic societies. Chapters vary in depth and horizon. No particular focus—Tedious to read.

Bernard Lewis (ed.), *The World of Islam* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), is a thematically organized book with chapters on literature, jurisprudence, sufism, the cities, the Ottoman and modern experiences. Includes hundreds of illustrations and maps.


*The History of al-Tabarî* (State University of New York Press, 1989), is a multi-volume series of the translation of the “History” of Tabarî, one of the major historians and interpreters of the Qur’ân of the early Islamic and empire periods.

al-Shâfi’î, *Risâla. Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence*, translated by Majid Khadduri (Islamic Texts Society, 1987). Shâfi’î was the founding father of one of the four major schools of Sunni jurisprudence and the *Risâla* contains some of his major theoretical foundations on the notions analogy, *qiyyâs*, and the *ijmâ’*, consensus of the community.


Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago University Press, 1988), discusses the notion of “government” and “politics” in Islamic societies.


2. *The Ottoman Empire*

**REFERENCE**

For a general social history of The Ottoman Empire, see H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Volume One, 2 parts (London: Oxford University Press, 1950-57).


For a narrative account of the rise of the Ottoman Empire viewed from the standpoint of historical geography, see Donald Edgar Pitcher, *An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire. From earliest times to the end of the Sixteenth Century with detailed maps to illustrate the expansion of the Sultanate* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972).

George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman*, 7 vol. (Oxford, 1905-6) contains selections from the Ottoman judicial code.

**GENERAL HISTORIES**


Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (New York: Knopf, 1972)


**THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE INTER-STATE SYSTEM**


**WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY**

There has been numerous studies within the last two decades that describe in economic terms how the Ottoman societies have reacted to what is now known as the process of “incorporation” of the Ottoman Empire in the world-economy. Despite their merits, “world-systems” analyses are weak in understanding and interpreting cultures and social structures. See for example, Immanuel Wallerstein & Resat Kasaba, “Incorporation into the World-Economy: Change in the Structure of the Ottoman Empire,1750-1839,” in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont & Paul Dumont, eds., *Économie et sociétés dans l’Empire ottoman* (Paris: CNRS, 1983), 335-54. Some of the most recent titles in “world-systems” include the following:


• SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY
Halil Inalcik, Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), is a reproduction of a series of articles on the “beginnings” of the Ottoman Empire, the impact of the Annales school on Ottoman historiography, etc., by a leading figure in the field of Ottoman studies. See also by the same author his collected studies under the title The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy (London: Variorum Reprints, 1978).


Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population: Demographic and Social Characteristics (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). This book attempts, on the basis of original archive materials, to show the demographic dimension of Middle Eastern and Balkan societies under Ottoman rule in the 19th century. See the review of Inalcik in IJMES, 21/3 (1989).


Uriel Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, ed. by V. L. Ménage (Oxford, 1973) discusses, among others, the relation between the Islamic shari’a and the Ottoman qânûn.


On women in the Ottoman Empire, see Fanny Davis, The Ottoman Lady. A Social History from 1718 to 1918 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).

Ehud R. Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression (Princeton University Press, 1982), stresses the key role of the British in the elimination of the trade in black slaves from Africa and the importance of the Ottoman’s own actions in abolishing trade in white slaves from the lands around the Black Sea.


Charles Issawi, Economic History of Turkey (Chicago, 1980), is an account, mainly based on the European consular correspondence of the 19th century, of the Turkish economy during the period of Western colonialism and imperialism.


Jacques Thobie, Intérêts et impérialisme français dans l’empire Ottoman (Paris, 1977) focuses on the effects of French imperialism on the Ottoman Empire in general and on some Arab Provinces in particular (Syria and Lebanon).

• THE STATE, IDEOLOGY, & RELIGION

Cornell H. Fleisher, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali, 1546-1600 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). The Ottoman 16th century through the eyes


For a political anthropology of the Ottoman Empire and the cultural barriers for its development, see Ilkay Sunar, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s Development* (Ankara, 1974).


Another excellent work of economic synthesis is Roger Owen’s *The Middle East in the World Economy* (London: Methuen, 1981).

William Polk & Richard Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago, 1968) contains some key articles by Karpat, Chevallier, Berque, Hourani, and others. Highly recommended.

4. Syria, Lebanon, & Palestine

The Lebanese historiography did not progress much beyond the classical works of Chevallier (1971), Harik (1968), and Smilyanskaya (1965), despite a number of interesting recent publications in the field.

Dominique Chevallier, *La société du mont Liban à l’époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe* (Paris, 1971) is a complete study on the economic, cultural, and political effects of the industrial revolution on Mount Lebanon during the 19th century. See also by the same author, *Villes et travail en Syrie, du XIXe au XXe siècle* (Paris, 1982).

Iliya Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society, Lebanon, 1711–1845* (Princeton, N. J., 1968), is very powerful in analyzing the cultural transformations of the societies of Mount Lebanon. The chapters on the process of “rationalization” (in the sense of Weber) of the Maronite Church are among the best in the field.

I. M. Smilyanskaya’s thesis, *Krestyanskie dvizhenie v Livane* (Moscow, 1965), is unfortunately only available in the original Russian with a complete Arabic translation (Beirut, 1971). Some chapters are translated in English in Issawi (1966 & 1988). Smilyanskaya’s thesis is an attempt to explain the peasant’s movements of the 19th century in terms of class struggle rather than inter-confessional struggles.


William Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), is another classical study of Mount Lebanon.

other things served as financial comptroller to the Shihâb emirs of Hâsbayyâ and in his later years was a physician and consul to the United States in Damascus.

Thomas Philipp, *The Syrians in Egypt, 1725-1975* (Stuttgart, 1985), discusses the immigration of Syrians (mainly Christians) to Egypt starting with the Ottoman period.


Philip Khouri, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1983), discusses the formation, during the Tanzimât period and after the Land Code of 1858, of provincial bureaucracies composed mainly of Damascene land-owners belonging to the traditional notable's class.

Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics. Damascene Fractions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries* (Stuttgart, 1985), is a more complete version of Khouri’s thesis on Damascus. Her division of the city in three “conflicting” parts and the maps provided are the best parts of the book.


Roger Owen, ed., *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Carbondale, Ill., 1982), contains a series of well written articles on the effects of foreign investments in Palestine.

Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976) focuses on the Arab and Ottoman reactions (mainly by leading politicians and intellectuals) to Jewish immigration to Palestine during the last four decades of Ottoman rule.


David Kushner (ed.), *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem-Leiden, 1986), has a number of interesting articles on the economy of Palestine at the turn of this century. Problems related to the demography, the system of ilitzâm, and the waqf (Gabriel Baer), are well covered. See also Moshe Ma’oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1975). On the Jews of the Arab Provinces of the Ottoman Empire, see Norman A. Stillman, *The Jews of the Arab Lands. A History and Source Book* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979).

Gabriel Baer, “The Dismemberment of Awqâf in Early 19th Century Jerusalem,” *AAS*, 13(1979), 220-41. This article, based on the law-court registers of Jerusalem, shows that the process of the “dismemberment” of the waqf is only a judicial device to transform it to the status of a quasi private property.


Justin McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine. Population Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate* (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990), shows that Arabs were a large majority in Palestine up to 1947.


5. Iraq

Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton University Press, 1978), covers extensively the rise and fall of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) in the 1940s in the second part of the book, while the first part is an introduction to the Iraqi society from a profile of its landowning and other social “classes.” Finally, a third part deals, though less extensively than for the Communists, with the formation of the Ba’th and the coming to power of Saddām Husayn. The three parts seem like three different narratives without a major thread to bring them together. Extensive use of the Foreign Office archives that the British left in Iraq.

Samir al-Khalil, *Republic of Fear. The Inside Story of Saddam’s Iraq* (Pantheon, 1989), analyses the logic of Iraqi “totalitarianism.” Important insights on the ideology of the Ba’th party, its organization, and its links with other state organizations such as the army, the mukhābarāt, etc. See also by the same author, *The Monument. Art, Vulgarity and Responsibility in Iraq* (University of California Press, 1991).

6. Iran

Roy Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet. Religion and Politics in Iran* (Pantheon, 1985), is an analysis of some of the main intellectual movements in Iran prior and during the Islamic Revolution in 1978 as seen through the eyes of a “character” under the pseudonym of Ali Hashemi. However, despite this focus on the education and becoming of a single Iranian ʿālim, the overall point of the book remains unclear.


7. Turkey

Serif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey. The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (SUNY, 1989), raises the question of religious fundamentalism in Turkey through the case of Said Nursi and his movement.


8. Egypt

André Raymond’s seminal work Artisans et commerçants au Caire au 18ème siècle (Damascus, 1973-4) in 2 volumes is a must for the economic history of Egypt during the 18th century. Compare with Marcus (1989) and Brown (1976) on the concept of Arab/Islamic cities.

For the 19th century and in particular the Muhammad Ali experience in “modernization,” a revisionist work is Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge, 1984).

Judith Tucker, Women in Nineteenth Century Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 1985), discusses the problems in the historiography of women in Middle Eastern societies.

Bryon Cannon, Politics of Law and the Courts in Nineteenth-Century Egypt (University of Utah Press, 1988), explores the interaction between local and international factors, both political and economic, that affected the establishment of an effective civil and criminal court system in Egypt during the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt (Cambridge University Press, 1988), examines the peculiar methods of order and truth that characterize the modern West through a re-reading of Europe’s colonial impact on 19th century Egypt.


Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism. Egypt, 1760-1840 (University of Texas Press, 1979). Gran’s main hypothesis is that the output of the ‘ulamâ’ marked “developments in secular culture and were supportive of capitalism.”

Gabriel Baer, Egyptian Guilds in Modern Times (Jerusalem, 1964).

Juan R.I. Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East. Social and Cultural Origins of Egypt’s ‘Urabi Movement (Princeton University Press, 1993), focuses on the ‘Urâbî movement as a broadly based social revolution hardly underway when it was cut off by the British. A challenge to traditional élite-centered theories.


Iran & Egypt


9. The Maghreb

What is interesting in the Moroccan case is that this society has not been subject to Ottoman rule. Hence it could be used as a background for a comparative analysis with the Ottoman societies.

Abdallah Laroui’s Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain,1830-1912 (Paris: Maspero, 1977), is a monumental study on how the idea of Moroccan “nationalism” evolved through the existence of “internal” institutions (mainly the Makhzen). Highly recommended.


10. The Modern Middle East Within an Anthropological & Historical Perspectives

Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (Routledge, 1992), presents the state, society, religion and the military within a comparative perspective.

Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East. An Anthropological Approach, 2nd. ed. (Prentice-Hall, 1981, 1989), covers a wide variety of topics from the villages and cities to self, gender and sexuality. Depth of treatment varies from one chapter to another—some chapters, like the one on the cities, are purely disappointing while others fail to come up with an approach from the multitude of secondary studies that the author relies on. A crucial book for an overview on the current state of anthropological literature on the Middle East.
Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford University Press, 1990), originally published in Paris as *Le sens pratique* (1980), is a pioneering study on the social “practices” of the Kabyles in Algeria, based on a field work in the 1950s, and with tremendous philosophical, epistemological and anthropological implications. Recommended for those who would like to take account of the most recent discoveries in the “social sciences,” and most notably anthropology and combine them with their own historical findings.


Haeri, Shahla, *Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Iran* (Tauris, 1990), on the status of women and the types of marriages (in particular the *mut'a*, pleasure marriage) in contemporary Iran.

Rosen, Lawrence, *The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society* (Cambridge UP, 1989), is an important study on the practice of law in Morocco. Rosen starts with the basic assumption that law in every society is part of the cultural system, and then proceeds to show that “bargaining” is an essential “concept” towards an understanding of the “practice” of Islamic law. A breakthrough in the study of law in general.

Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State. Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society* (California University Press, 1992), discusses the transmission, conservation and interpretation of the *fiqh* (jurisprudence) literature from one generation to another in the context of an Islamic society like Yemen. Focuses on details that historians usually avoid. Recommended for those interested in history within an anthropological perspective.

Michael Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, *Debating Muslims. Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tradition* (Wisconsin University Press, 1990). Written in a post-modernist Derridean style, this book is supposed to show that all kinds of Islamic practices wherever they’re located are always in a permanent process of adaptation and re-adaptation to the social realities of a particular period. This is done through a re-assessment of the previous mainly “textual” traditions. Thus, according to our authors, it is the various hermeneutical traditions that save Islam (or any other religion for that matter) from any dogmatism—even though they note a fear of *différance* in the Islamic traditions. Shortly prior to publication, the authors have added an annex on Salman Rushdi’s *The Satanic Verses* which is probably the best thing ever written on this highly controversial book. For one thing, the authors show quite convincingly that Rushdi’s knowledge of his “Islamic material” was very close to the “authoritative sources” of Islam.

Smadar Lavie, *The Poetics of Military Occupation. Mzeina Allegories of Bedouin Identity Under Israeli and Egyptian Rule* (California University Press, 1990). This book, based on extensive fieldwork on the South Sinai desert, borrows several post-modernist and deconstructionist approaches from literary criticism and creatively applies them to the Mzeina Bedouins. Thus the book is constructed around several “allegorical characters”—the Shaykh, the mad-woman, the old-woman, the ex-smuggler, and the “one who writes about us,” i.e. the author herself who had decided at one point to leave the Bedouins and *write* about them at Berkeley. The “allegorical characters” are supposed to show the Bedouins-in-transition between their old kinship and survival oriented ideology towards “modernity,” i.e. the male Bedouins as part of a cheap and under-paid Israeli labor-force. Her text is inserted with large “dialogues”—or “interviews”—to emphasize the author’s “textual” approach: translate practices into “texts” with meaning.


Virginia R. Dominguez, *People as Subject, People as Object. Selfhood and Peoplehood in Contemporary Israel* (Wisconsin University Press).