This seminar analyzes the cultures, societies and politics of the contemporary Middle East and North Africa. The modern Middle East emerged out of the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War. As Empire it was composed of a multitude of social, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, the dominant one being the Turkic population of Anatolia. Most Arab societies (Morocco excluded) were under Ottoman rule for four centuries. During this long period, the Ottomans kept these societies “autonomous” in the sense that there was no process of “integration” of the various ethnic groups from the part of the administration and the state. These groups had their own “representatives” who acted as “intermediaries” between the local populations and the apparatus of the state. Thus, in the case of religious groups, millets, in particular Christians, Armenians, and Jews, their de facto local representatives were their religious leaders who were at the same time responsible for the collection of all kinds of “minority” taxes. But the majority of the subjects of the empire were represented by their local notables (a’yân) who were for the most part located in the cities and who claimed to be descendants of the Prophet, ashrâf. Such claims were at the basis of their legitimate domination and accorded them tremendous political and economic power. Those prebendal notables were indeed mostly urban based rentiers and tax-farmers (multazims), receiving their prebends from the state, while collecting taxes and rents on state-owned lands, mîrî.

The term “decline” is often associated with the Ottoman Empire. Historians tend to think that since the end of the 16th century the empire failed to modernize and challenge a new Europe whose “universalistic” culture and values became expansionist. At its root European civilization has evolved since the Middle Ages into individualistic (a recognition of the individual subject and citizen as the basis of all action, be it social or political), and technicalistic values (primacy of science and technology), amid a shift from absolutism to the nation-state. This has become even more urgent towards the end of the 18th century, at the age of Enlightenment, when the French, through the Napoleonic wars, were exporting the principles of their Revolution to all Europe, and in 1798 to Egypt.

The stagnation metaphor has become even more intimidating during the first three decades of the 19th century, at the epoch of the industrial revolution in Europe. In 1839 and later in 1856, the Ottomans promulgated two edicts with the intention to modernize the apparatus of the state and
the societies it controlled. Thus the “minorities” saw their rights publicly acknowledged for the first time, in addition to a manifest desire to abolish the tax-farming system, iltizâm, in conjunction with a partial modernization of the judicial system and the bureaucracy.

At the end of the First War, and despite an ambitious program of reforms (Tanẓīmāt), the empire was already totally dismantled and divided, amid the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, between zones of Russian, British, and French influence. The newly created nation-states, in their actual political and geographic frameworks, are hence very recent—mostly an outcome of the independence movements in the aftermath of the Second World War.

For our purposes here the Ottoman background proves crucial for a better understanding of the main problems that most Middle Eastern countries are facing today: economic stagnation; failure of technicalization and industrialization; the low status of women; social, political and economic inequalities; and the predominance of autocratic régimes (which signals a failure of the nation-state). If we assume that the Ottoman era was the only moment in history when the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa were politically united under a modicum of common economic structures, how could then such an infrastructure be best documented? And which elements of such an infrastructure contributed most towards a slowing down of the modernization process that the Ottoman élite had in mind? We are, indeed, faced here with a host of theoretical problems, making it difficult to even adopt a basic chronological outlook on where to locate the “decline” thesis. For example, while Marshall Hodgson has argued in volume 3 of the venerable Venture of Islam that the eighteenth century constituted “the age of deluge” for the Ottomans, whereby the central élites developed a catch-up mode of consciousness in the aftermath of the French Revolution, a more careful socio-economic analysis of the totality of the Mediterranean, such as the one attempted a long time ago by Fernand Braudel, would place the burden of the European metamorphosis into modernity in “the long sixteenth century” (ca. 1450–1600): it was, indeed, within that time framework that Europe had finally abandoned its old medieval infrastructures, and moved into the world of centralized absolutist states, the bill of exchange, stocks and bonds, public debt, and science and technology. Notwithstanding Ottoman military prowess and the takeover of Constantinople 1453, Ottoman societies, beginning with Anatolia itself, were already lagging behind, as the patrimonial and prebendal state infrastructure was only an evolution of the princely militaristic states that emerged in the aftermath of the slow decline of the Abbasids, thus preempting any modernist breakthrough. One could go even further and argue that the differences between the east and west of the Mediterranean were already “visible” since Greek and Roman times, and the failure of the Greek–Roman ethos to sustain itself, after a very long millennium, on the eastern Mediterranean. The Christianization and eventual breakup of the Roman Empire, the survival of Christendom in Byzantium, and the coming of Islamdom in what used to be the eastern provinces of the Roman Imperium, all highlight major civilizational differences on the Mediterranean at works since ancient times—“modernity” representing only the latest and most recent phase, which only accelerated differences and economic inequalities.

When documenting the Ottoman social structures, however, it is important not to categorize them as “feudal.” In effect, feudalism implies a system of rights, duties and obligations which were absent on the Ottoman side, as it would be more adequate to describe Ottoman societies as a combination of patrimonialism and prebendalism. The next step would be to follow Barrington Moore in his tracking the origins of democracy and dictatorship, hence the importance for an understanding of the Ottoman peasantry, landlordism, and the urban mercantile, manufacturing and financial groups: What were the relations between all such groups? As the land surplus has failed to be invested in urban projects, Ottoman landlordism, protected by a patrimonial and prebendal state, had grown into a type, common across Asia (e.g. India and China), that was abusive and parasitic. Between the two world wars, the newly formed countries and societies on
the map below, which represent the core of the modern middle east, were by and large still not only essentially agrarian, but more importantly, with large and parasitic landowning classes, whose powers had either to be gradually reduced, as in Turkey, or through statist decrees, as in Iran in 1963 during the so-called “white revolution” of the second Pahlavi Shah, or else, as in the majority of cases (Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Algeria) through the harsh and unsuccessful land reforms of the 1950s and 1960s promulgated by military dictatorships (the free officers in Egypt, the Baath in Iraq and Syria, and the pro-FLN state in Algeria). If it is important to follow the peasantry and landlordism and their relations to other urban classes from Ottoman to post-Ottoman times, it is because such an analysis would hold the key to modernization. Thus, for example, if Turkey is today part of the G–20 industrial group, it is because it successfully managed since 1931 the replacement of the landowning élite with a more dynamic élite composed of the state military, politicians, entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and middle class people through the party system. In short, it is important not to look at the middle east as a coherent whole, but more as a fractured region where differences matter and should be carefully documented and analyzed.
The middle east is currently plagued by protracted wars of attrition. With the end of Empire and colonialism, the postwar era has produced authoritarian, if not totalitarian (or fascist), states for which Egypt and Syria would serve as prototype. What needs to be analyzed, therefore, is the nature of the Arab authoritarian states, their connections to their Ottoman and colonial past, and the kind of “society” that has emerged out of the postwar era.

The prototype of the authoritarian state that grew in Egypt in the wake of the Free Officers revolution in 1952 has spread all over the Arab world and the eastern Mediterranean: Iraq in 1958 and 1963, Syria in 1963, and Libya in 1969; the cycle came to an end with the Iranian revolution in 1978–79 which brought down a well established tradition of Shi‘i monarchy. Thus, by the 1970s, the Middle East was already locked politically with Nasserism, Baathism, and the Iranian Khomeinist theocracy. Other non-state “movements,” of the like of Hamas in the occupied Palestinian territories and the Hezbollah in Lebanon, are offshoots of the other statist movements in the area. The social movements that have spawned since 2011, either peacefully or violently—the so-called “Arab Spring”—have attempted to break down such political stalemate, to no avail. Which placed countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Libya, directly in a situation of protracted wars, sprawling across porous borders. Military groups, mostly with jihadic insight and strategy, have been moving in the last couple of years across borders, gaining territory, while imposing their own economic and political rules. In the meantime, the state has become one force on the ground among many others, with an incomplete inability to recapture lost territories.

The structure of such states invariably points to an esprit de corps (‘asabiyya) that constitutes itself through bonds of consanguinity, though is not limited to the latter. Thus, Iraq had been managed since the 1970s until the American occupation in 2003 by the Sunni Tikriti clan to which belonged former presidents Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein; for the same period, until now, Syria’s state has been dominated by the Alawi Asad clan; Iran’s Islamic Republic is dominated by a brand of Persian-speaking Shi’ism known as the Twelver Imamis, operating under Khomeini’s doctrine of the “jurist’s political authority,” and which although numerically superior to all other “ethnic minorities,” only survives through the brutal marginalization of the latter (Kurds, Sunnis, Arabs, Azeris, Turcomans, Baloch, Armenians, Jews, Christians, Baha’is, etc.). Thus, the ‘asabiyya-driven “state” structurally survives by limiting itself to a faction of its “ethnic” belonging: when Baathism was the ideology of the Iraqi state, it was not the Sunnis that were in control, as the common assumption goes, but only the Tikritis among the Sunnis; or, in Baathist Syria, it is not the Alawis who are in control, but a faction of the Alawis which have managed to marginalize the other tribes and clans, subserving them by military might, without, however, breaking their internal bonds. To be sure, such ‘asabiyya processes of marginalization did not happen overnight, as they took decades of military coups and political maneuvering to unravel.

The ‘asabiyya-driven “state” leaves its imprints on all aspects of the civilian bureaucracy and the military, and various apparatuses, in particular the intelligence services, republican and revolutionary guards, and paramilitary forces, whose main concern is not
the safety of the “national” territory per se, but the ‘ašābiyya sitting on the top, imposing itself by force on other ‘ašābiyyas, tribes, clans, religious groups and ethnicities. As such, it is neither a “state” nor a modern nation-state, which de jure would have to politically protect its “society” of individual citizens as a totality. In its stead, the ‘ašābiyya-driven “state” creates a “society” at its own image, one whose societal bonds are fragmented and tied to the main dominating ‘ašābiyya, where associationism is constantly hampered by political pressures.

It goes without saying that countries of the Arab Spring have either totally deteriorated (Syria, Yemen, and Libya, not to mention the breakdown of Iraq in summer 2014, all of which are into full-fledged civil wars with no end in sight; or the partition of Sudan in 2012, which led to a reinstatement of the civil war in the oil-rich south between the two dominant tribal factions), or else have nominally changed, otherwise they’re into the same kind of rule dominated by the military and intelligence apparatuses, in spite of all claims for “free” parliamentary and presidential elections (Egypt and Tunisia; not to mention an early participant in the Arab Spring, Bahrain, where the Shi’a majority has been claiming its “right” vis-à-vis a Saudi-protected Sunni monarchy, to no avail). It remains unclear, however, how we proceed from there. Is this the price to pay for the apparent dismantlement of the “model” of the authoritarian “state” that saw light with the free officers’ “revolution” in Egypt in 1952, and which was replicated in Iraq in 1958, Syria in 1963, and Libya in 1969?

What seems clear, at least for now, is that the “socialist” “state,” as constructed by the likes of Nasser in Egypt and the Baath in Iraq and Syria, which has claimed full “inclusivity” to the populations at large, with all their regional differences, ethnicities, and religions, was by and large unrepresentative of “civil society.” Not only did it fail at “representation,” understood as the right of difference, but it hampered the work of “associationism” which proves necessary for the survival of “civil society.” What we are witnessing right now, in countries like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya, is the very impossibility of the continuation of such a pattern of statist political domination as instituted by Nasserism and Baathism. It remains unclear, however, what the alternatives are and what kind of “replacement” could be envisaged. In the early days of the so-called Arab Spring crowds from Tunis to Cairo and Manama in Bahrain were chanting the promises of a “democratic” state, one that accommodates the rule of law, an impersonal bureaucracy, and accountability, and where religion would not matter in politics. Needless to say, such rosy future is at best uncertain.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

There are weekly readings that we’ll discuss collectively. Your participation is essential for the success of the course. You will be asked to prepare a presentation on a chapter or topic or to interpret specific passages in class.

You’ll have to submit three interpretive essays based on our weekly readings and sets of questions. Each paper counts as 25 percent of the total. All interpretive essays are take-home and you’ll be given a week to submit them. The purpose of the interpretative essays is to give you the opportunity to go “beyond” the literal meaning of a text and adopt interpretive and “textual” techniques. All papers must be submitted on time according to the deadlines set below.

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<th>Assignment</th>
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<tr>
<td>First Interpretive Essay</td>
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<td>Second Interpretive Essay</td>
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<td>Final Interpretive Essay</td>
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<td>Presentations, Blackboard postings, and class attendance and participation</td>
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- It is essential that you complete all readings on time, and that you come to class well prepared. **Always come to class with the required book:** we’ll discuss all readings extensively and analyze passages.
- Papers are based on our weekly readings. They consist of a single essay for which you’ll receive the assignments at the dates below, and you’ll submit them in class a week later.
- For all papers follow the procedures outlined below in the section on papers.
- Papers must be submitted only in class. Do not send any material as an email attachment. Do not submit your papers outside the classroom.
- It’s your responsibility to submit all essays and papers **in class** on time at the deadlines below. Late papers will be graded accordingly, and papers submitted a week after the deadline will be graded F.
- You must also submit, in addition to the printed hard copy, an **identical** electronic file in the assignment section on Sakai.
- Each non-submitted paper will receive the grade of F, and your final grade will be averaged accordingly.
- Presentation assignments will be posted on Sakai every week and by email one week in advance. They consist of individual chapter assignments. The same chapter could be assigned to more than one student, and a 1,000-word synopsis must be posted individually by each student on Blackboard forum 2 at least 24 hours before the presentation.


Readings

The following readings and essays and their respective dates could be subject to change, pending on our progress throughout the semester. Changes will be announced beforehand on Sakai and by email.

- Week 1: August 25/27/29
- Week 2: September 1/3/5
  Barkey, continued
- Week 3: September 8/10/12
  Barkey, continued
- Week 4: September 15
- Week 5: September 22/24/26
  Yavuz, continued
- Week 6: September 29; October 1/3
  Yavuz, continued
- Week 7: October 8/10

First essay: to be submitted in class on October 10

- Week 8: October 13/15/17
  Waterbury, continued
- Week 9: October 20/22/24
  Waterbury, continued
- Week 10: October 27/29/31
- Week 11: November 3/5/7
  Messick, continued

Second essay: to be submitted on November 14

- Week 12: November 10/12/14
- Week 13: November 17/19/21
  Achcar, continued
- Week 14: November 24
- Week 15: December 1/3/5
  Adria, continued

Final essay: to be submitted December 10
PAPERS

Follow the Turabian guide below, or The Chicago Manual of Style, for all your papers, regarding formatting, footnotes and bibliographies.


Please use the following guidelines for all papers:

• use 8x10 white paper (the size and color of this paper). Do not use legal size or colored paper.
• use a laser printer or a good inkjet printer and hand in the original.
• only type on one side of the paper.
• should be double spaced, with single spaced footnotes at the end of each page and an annotated bibliography at the end (see sample bibliography below).
• keep ample left and right margins for comments and corrections of at least 1.25 inches each.
• all pages should be numbered and stapled.
• a cover page should include the following: paper’s title, course number and section, your name, address, e-mail, and telephone.
• Poorly written or hastily drafted papers may not be accepted, or at least may not receive the appropriate comments.

ELECTRONIC FORUM

This course is listed on the Loyola Sakai webpage to freely post messages and conduct discussions: login at <sakai.luc.edu> and follow the instructions.

• You must post each week a message on national or world events, with a particular focus on the Middle East and Islam.
• By the end of the semester each student should have posted 14 messages.
• Posted messages, presentations, and class attendance and participation count as 25% of the final grade.
• For each of the three forums follow the appropriate online instructions.

Notes on the Sakai forums; check each forum for more information

Forum 1:
A general forum where you can post all kinds of probes regarding our weekly readings and essays. All inquiries on the essays should be posted here rather than addressed to me personally.
Forum 2:
Each oral presentation of an individual book-chapter must be accompanied with a minimum 1,000-word synopsis. If you’ve missed a presentation, whatever the reason, you must post a 2,000-word synopsis at your earliest convenience.

Forum 3:
Make sure that by the end of the semester you’ve completed at least 14 postings on national and world events of your own choice, preceded by your own commentary.

SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Islam & The Early Empires—General

The Qurʾān is the holy book of the Muslims (in all their different factions and sects) delivered by God in Arabic to the community of believers (umma) through the “medium” of the Prophet Muhammad in sessions of “revelation” (wāḥi). Thus Arabic is not only the language of the Qurʾān (and the Sunna), but also a divine language, the language of God. All translations of the Qurʾān are thus considered as illegitimate and inaccurate. There are several such “translations”/“interpretations” available. A classical one would be that of A.J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (Oxford University Press). For a recent “reading” of the Qurʾān, see Jacques Berque, Relire le Coran (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993).

R. Stephen Humphreys, Islamic History. A Framework for Inquiry (Princeton University Press, 1991), is a long annotated and commented bibliography thematically organized. Recommended for all those looking at the best in the field for sources available in English, French and German. Some references to primary sources, mainly Arabic medieval sources, are also included. The problem with this “inquiry” is that it excludes from its field of investigation all publications in modern Arabic, as well as Turkish and Persian. In short, this book is an excellent tool for a primary survey on the status of the Middle Eastern Studies field in Europe and North America.


Ira Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge University Press, 1988), is a complete fourteen-century history of Islamic societies. Chapters vary in depth and horizon. No particular focus—Tedious to read.

Bernard Lewis (ed.), The World of Islam (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), is a thematically organized book with chapters on literature, jurisprudence, sufism, the cities, the Ottoman and modern experiences. Includes hundreds of illustrations and maps.

Watt, W. M., Muhammad at Mecca (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953); Muhammad at Medina (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), both are classics describing the life of the Prophet and his first achievements in Mecca and Medina.


*bThe History of al-Ṭabarī* (State University of New York Press, 1989), is a multi-volume series of the translation of the “History” of Ṭabarī, one of the major historians and interpreters of the Qur’ān of the early Islamic and empire periods.

al-Shāfi’ī, *Risāla. Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence*, translated by Majid Khadduri (Islamic Texts Society, 1987). Shāfi’ī was the founding father of one of the four major schools of Sunni jurisprudence and the *Risāla* contains some of his major theoretical foundations on the notions analogy, *qiyyās*, and the *ijmā’,* consensus of the community.


Maxime Rodinson, *Muhammad* (Pantheon, 1971), is an interesting interpretation of the early Islamic period based on a social and economic analysis of the Arabian Peninsula at the dawn of Islam.


Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago University Press, 1988), discusses the notion of “government” and “politics” in Islamic societies.


2. The Ottoman Empire

• REFERENCE
For a general social history of The Ottoman Empire, see H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, Volume One, 2 parts (London: Oxford University Press, 1950-57).


For a narrative account of the rise of the Ottoman Empire viewed from the standpoint of historical geography, see Donald Edgar Pitcher, *An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire. From earliest times to the end of the Sixteenth Century with detailed maps to illustrate the expansion of the Sultanate* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972).

George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman*, 7 vol. (Oxford, 1905-6) contains selections from the Ottoman judicial code.

• GENERAL HISTORIES
Norman Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (New York: Knopf, 1972)

• THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE INTER-STATE SYSTEM

• WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY
There has been numerous studies within the last two decades that describe in economic terms how the Ottoman societies have reacted to what is now known as the process of “incorporation” of the Ottoman Empire in the world-economy. Despite their merits,
“world-systems” analyses are weak in understanding and interpreting cultures and social structures. See for example, Immanuel Wallerstein & Reşat Kasaba, “Incorporation into the World-Economy: Change in the Structure of the Ottoman Empire, 1750-1839,” in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont & Paul Dumont, eds., Économie et sociétés dans l’Empire ottoman (Paris: CNRS, 1983), 335-54. Some of the most recent titles in “world-systems” include the following:


**SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY**

- Halil İnalcık, Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985), is a reproduction of a series of articles on the “beginnings” of the Ottoman Empire, the impact of the Annales school on Ottoman historiography, etc., by a leading figure in the field of Ottoman studies. See also by the same author his collected studies under the title The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy (London: Variorum Reprints, 1978).
- Kemal H. Karpat, Ottoman Population: Demographic and Social Characteristics (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). This book attempts, on the basis of original archive materials, to show the demographic dimension of Middle Eastern and Balkan societies under Ottoman rule in the 19th century. See the review of İnalcık in IJMES, 21/3 (1989).
- Uriel Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, ed. by V. L. Ménage (Oxford, 1973) discusses, among others, the relation between the Islamic shari’a and the Ottoman qâniün.
On women in the Ottoman Empire, see Fanny Davis, *The Ottoman Lady. A Social History from 1718 to 1918* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).

Ehud R. Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression* (Princeton University Press, 1982), stresses the key role of the British in the elimination of the trade in black slaves from Africa and the importance of the Ottoman’s own actions in abolishing trade in white slaves from the lands around the Black Sea.


Charles Issawi, *Economic History of Turkey* (Chicago, 1980), is an account, mainly based on the European consular correspondence of the 19th century, of the Turkish economy during the period of Western colonialism and imperialism.


• THE STATE, IDEOLOGY, & RELIGION


Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford University Press, 1968[1961]) A survey of the first Turkish pan-movements till the proclamation of the
Turkish Republic and its aftermath. See also Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism* (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1979).


For a political anthropology of the Ottoman Empire and the cultural barriers for its development, see Ilkay Sunar, *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s Development* (Ankara, 1974).

3. **The Arab Provinces. General.**


Another excellent work of economic synthesis is Roger Owen’s *The Middle East in the World Economy* (London: Methuen, 1981).

William Polk & Richard Chambers, eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago, 1968) contains some key articles by Karpat, Chevallier, Berque, Hourani, and others. Highly recommended.

4. **Syria, Lebanon, & Palestine**

The Lebanese historiography did not progress much beyond the classical works of Chevallier (1971), Harik (1968), and Smilyanskaya (1965), despite a number of interesting recent publications in the field.

Dominique Chevallier, *La société du mont Liban à l’époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe* (Paris, 1971) is a complete study on the economic, cultural, and political effects of the industrial revolution on Mount Lebanon during the 19th century. See also by the same author, *Villes et travail en Syrie, du XIXe au XXe siècle* (Paris, 1982).

Iliya Harik, *Politics and Change in a Traditional Society, Lebanon, 1711-1845* (Princeton, N. J., 1968), is very powerful in analyzing the cultural transformations of the societies of Mount Lebanon. The chapters on the process of “rationalization” (in the sense of Weber) of the Maronite Church are among the best in the field.

I. M. Smilyanskaya’s thesis, *Krestyanskoe dvizhenie v Livane* (Moscow,1965), is unfortunately only available in the original Russian with a complete Arabic translation (Beirut, 1971). Some chapters are translated in English in Issawi (1966 & 1988). Smilyanskaya’s thesis is an attempt to explain the peasant’s movements of the 19th century in terms of class struggle rather than inter-confessional struggles.


William Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), is another classical study of Mount Lebanon.

Mikhâyîl Mishâqa, *Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder. The History of the Lebanon in the 18th and 19th Centuries*, translated from the Arabic by Wheeler M. Thackston, Jr. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), is a 19th century chronicle by Mishâqa (1800-1888) who among other things served as financial comptroller to the Shihâb emirs of ハウスbayyâ and in his later years was a physician and consul to the United States in Damascus.

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Philip Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1983), discusses the formation, during the Tanzimât period and after the Land Code of 1858, of provincial bureaucracies composed mainly of Damascene land-owners belonging to the traditional notable’s class.

Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics. Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries* (Stuttgart, 1985), is a more complete version of Khoury’s thesis on Damascus. Her division of the city in three “conflicting” parts and the maps provided are the best parts of the book.


Roger Owen, ed., *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Carbondale, Ill., 1982), contains a series of well written articles on the effects of foreign investments in Palestine.

Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976) focuses on the Arab and Ottoman reactions (mainly by leading politicians and intellectuals) to Jewish immigration to Palestine during the last four decades of Ottoman rule.

Kenneth Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1984) is in some aspects a complementary study to Mandel’s *Arabs and Zionism*. Highly recommended for those interested in the social and economic dimensions of the Arab-

David Kushner (ed.), *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem-Leiden, 1986), has a number of interesting articles on the economy of Palestine at the turn of this century. Problems related to the demography, the system of *ıltizâm*, and the *waqf* (Gabriel Baer), are well covered. See also Moshe Ma’oz (ed.), *Studies on Palestine During the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1975). On the Jews of the Arab Provinces of the Ottoman Empire, see Norman A. Stillman, *The Jews of the Arab Lands: A History and Source Book* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979).

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Justin McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine. Population Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate* (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990), shows that Arabs were a large majority in Palestine up to 1947.


5. Iraq

Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton University Press, 1978), covers extensively the rise and fall of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) in the 1940s in the second part of the book, while the first part is a social history of Iraqi society from a profile of its landowning and other social “classes.” Finally, a third part deals, though less extensively than for the Communists, with the formation of the Ba’th and the coming to power of Saddām Husayn. The three parts seem like three different narratives without a major thread to bring them together. Extensive use of the Foreign Office archives that the British left in Iraq.

Samir al-Khalil, *Republic of Fear. The Inside Story of Saddam’s Iraq* (Pantheon, 1989), analyses the logic of Iraqi “totalitarianism.” Important insights on the ideology of the Ba’th party, its organization, and its links with other state organizations such as the army, the *mukhābarât*, etc. See also by the same author, *The Monument. Art, Vulgarité and Responsibility in Iraq* (University of California Press, 1991).
6. Iran

Roy Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet. Religion and Politics in Iran* (Pantheon, 1985), is an analysis of some of the main intellectual movements in Iran prior and during the Islamic Revolution in 1978 as seen through the eyes of a “character” under the pseudonym of Ali Hashemi. However, despite this focus on the education and becoming of a single Iranian ‘ālim, the overall point of the book remains unclear.


7. Turkey

Serif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey. The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi* (SUNY, 1989), raises the question of religious fundamentalism in Turkey through the case of Said Nursi and his movement.


**8. Egypt**

André Raymond’s seminal work *Artisans et commerçants au Caire au 18ème siècle* (Damascus, 1973-4) in 2 volumes is a must for the economic history of Egypt during the 18th century. Compare with Marcus (1989) and Brown (1976) on the concept of Arab–Ottoman–Islamic cities.


Judith Tucker, *Women in Nineteenth Century Egypt* (Cambridge University Press, 1985), discusses the problems in the historiography of women in Middle Eastern societies.

Byron Cannon, *Politics of Law and the Courts in Nineteenth-Century Egypt* (University of Utah Press, 1988), explores the interaction between local and international factors, both political and economic, that affected the establishment of an effective civil and criminal court system in Egypt during the last decades of the nineteenth century.

Timothy Mitchell, *Colonizing Egypt* (Cambridge University Press, 1988), examines the peculiar methods of order and truth that characterize the modern West through a re-reading of Europe’s colonial impact on 19th century Egypt.


Peter Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism. Egypt, 1760-1840* (University of Texas Press, 1979). Gran’s main hypothesis is that the output of the ‘ulamâ‘ marked “developments in secular culture and were supportive of capitalism.”


9. The Maghreb

What is interesting in the Moroccan case is that this society has not been subject to Ottoman rule. Hence it could be used as a background for a comparative analysis with the Ottoman societies.

Abdallah Laroui’s *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain,1830-1912* (Paris: Maspero, 1977), is a monumental study on how the idea of Moroccan “nationalism” evolved through the existence of “internal” institutions (mainly the Makhzen). Highly recommended.


10. The Modern Middle East Within an Anthropological & Historical Perspectives

Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (Routledge, 1992), presents the state, society, religion and the military within a comparative perspective.

Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East. An Anthropological Approach, 2nd. ed. (Prentice-Hall, 1981, 1989), covers a wide variety of topics from the villages and cities to self, gender and sexuality. Depth of treatment varies from one chapter to another—some chapters, like the one on the cities, are purely disappointing while others fail to come up with an approach from the multitude of secondary studies that the author relies on. A crucial book for an overview on the current state of anthropological literature on the Middle East.

Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford University Press, 1990), originally published in Paris as Le sens pratique (1980), is a pioneering study on the social “practices” of the Kabyles in Algeria, based on a field work in the 1950s, and with tremendous philosophical, epistemological and anthropological implications. Recommended for those who would like to take account of the most recent discoveries in the “social sciences,” and most notably anthropology and combine them with their own historical findings.


Goldberg, Harvey E., Jewish Life in Muslim Libya: Rivals and relatives (Chicago University Press, 1990).

Haeri, Shahla, Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage in Iran (Tauris, 1990), on the status of women and the types of marriages (in particular the mut’a, pleasure marriage) in contemporary Iran.

Rosen, Lawrence, The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society (Cambridge UP, 1989), is an important study on the practice of law in Morocco. Rosen starts with the basic assumption that law in every society is part of the cultural system, and then proceeds to show that “bargaining” is an essential “concept” towards an understanding of the “practice” of Islamic law. A breakthrough in the study of law in general.

Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State. Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society (California University Press, 1992), discusses the transmission, conservation and interpretation of the fiqh (jurisprudence) literature from one generation to another in the context of an Islamic society like Yemen. Focuses on details that historians usually avoid. Recommended for those interested in history within an anthropological perspective.

Michael Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, Debating Muslims. Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tradition (Wisconsin University Press, 1990). Written in a postmodernist Derridean style, this book is supposed to show that all kinds of Islamic practices wherever they’re located are always in a permanent process of adaptation and re-adaptation to the social realities of a particular period. This is done through a re-
assessment of the previous mainly “textual” traditions. Thus, according to our authors, it is the various hermeneutical traditions that save Islam (or any other religion for that matter) from any dogmatism—even though they note a fear of différance in the Islamic traditions. Shortly prior to publication, the authors have added an annex on Salman Rushdi’s The Satanic Verses which is probably the best thing ever written on this highly controversial book. For one thing, the authors show quite convincingly that Rushdi’s knowledge of his “Islamic material” was very close to the “authoritative sources” of Islam.

Smadar Lavie, The Poetics of Military Occupation. Mzeina Allegories of Bedouin Identity Under Israeli and Egyptian Rule (California University Press, 1990). This book, based on extensive fieldwork on the South Sinai desert, borrows several post-modernist and deconstructionist approaches from literary criticism and creatively applies them to the Mzeina Bedouins. Thus the book is constructed around several “allegorical characters”—the Shaykh, the mad-woman, the old-woman, the ex-smuggler, and the “one who writes about us,” i.e. the author herself who had decided at one point to leave the Bedouins and write about them at Berkeley. The “allegorical characters” are supposed to show the Bedouins-in-transition between their old kinship and survival oriented ideology towards “modernity,” i.e. the male Bedouins as part of a cheap and under-paid Israeli labor-force. Her text is inserted with large “dialogues”—or “interviews”—to emphasize the author’s “textual” approach: translate practices into “texts” with meaning.


Virginia R. Dominguez, People as Subject, People as Object. Selfhood and Peoplehood in Contemporary Israel (Wisconsin University Press).